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Over the coming weeks we will be featuring a series of interviews conducted by Mark Carrigan on the
nature of ‘big data’ and the opportunities and challenges presented for scholarship with its growing
influence. In this first interview, Rob Kitchin elaborates on the specific characteristics of big
data, the hype and hubris surrounding its advent, and the distinction between data-driven science
and empiricism.
What is ‘big data’? Is this a term we can meaningfully use given the hype surrounding it, or
does it obscure the continuities between contemporary fashions and longer standing trends
within the social sciences? 
As with many terms referring to new, diverse and quickly developing technological phenomena big data has been
variously defined.  Some definitions, whilst simple and clear — such as big data being any dataset that is too large
to fit in an Excel spreadsheet — have limited and misleading utility as they do not get to the heart as to what is
different ontologically and epistemologically about big data.  And there is a significance difference, which is why
there is so much hype surrounding these data.
For me, big data has seven traits — they are:
huge in volume, consisting of terrabytes or petabytes of data;
high in velocity, being created in or near real-time;
diverse in variety in type, being structured and unstructured in nature, and often temporally and spatially
referenced.
exhaustive in scope, striving to capture entire populations or systems (n=all)
fine-grained in resolution, aiming to be as detailed as possible, and uniquely indexical in identification;
relational in nature, containing common fields that enable the conjoining of different datasets;
flexible, holding the traits of extensionality (can add new fields easily) and scalable (can expand in size
rapidly).
Big data then are not simply very large datasets, they have other characteristics.  This is why a census dataset does
not constitute big data as I define it.  True, census data are huge in volume, seeks to be exhaustive, and has high
resolution (though they are usually aggregated for release), indexicality and relationality.  However, a census has
very slow velocity being generated once every ten years, very weak variety consisting of 30 to 40 structured
questions, no flexibility or scalability (once formulated a census is set and is being administered it is impossible to
tweak or add/remove questions).  Another traditionally large dataset, the national household survey, is more timely,
usually administered quarterly, but at the sacrifice of exhaustivity (it is sampled), but likewise lacks variety and
flexibility.
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In contrast, in 2012 Facebook was processing 2.5 billion pieces of diverse content (links, comments, audio and
video clips, etc), 2.7 billion ‘Like’ actions and 300 million photo uploads per day and Wal-Mart was generating more
than 2.5 petabytes (250 bytes) of data relating to more than 1 million customer transactions every hour.  These are
systems that can be altered on the fly, with new forms of content and metadata fields added, and can cope with
large ebbs and flows in data generation.
Early forms of big data include continuous streams of remote sensing, weather, and financial markets data, but in
recent years their production has exploded to include data generated by digital devices such as smart phones,
transactions and interactions across digital infrastructures (for example, email or online banking/purchasing),
clickstream data that records navigation through websites and apps, measurements from sensors embedded into
objects or environments, the scanning of machine-readable objects such as travel passes or barcodes, digital
surveillance technologies such as CCTV, and social media postings.  Most of these data hold all or most of the
characteristics of big data, with velocity being the key attribute, and there are no doubt varieties of big data.  The key
issue is that handling, storing and analyzing such data is a very different proposition to dealing with a census and
that has only become possible with advances in computation, widespread internetworking, new database structures,
and new forms of data analytics.
Viewed in this way I do think we can use the term meaningfully, regardless of the hype and hubris surrounding it. 
Indeed, I think it is the job of academics to unpack and conceptualise such terms in order to think through the
characteristics of a phenomenon that has rapidly gained discursive and material traction and is having major effects
in shaping company and government policy, investment and practices.  It is in this way we can start to get a handle
on what big data means for social sciences research and praxes and what it means for how government and
business are conducted.  In other words, the term only obscures if we allow it to.
Is there a risk that critiquing the excesses so readily identifiable in the discourse surrounding ‘big data’
could lead to a failure to recognise the immense value of new computational techniques and other
innovations? 
Nothing is, or should be, beyond critique.  Moreover, to date the hype and hubris surrounding big data has by far
outweighed the critique that has been levelled against it.  Funding agencies and corporate R&D departments are
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queuing up to pump money into big data and data analytics projects and training programmes.  Yet, if we want big
data to deliver valuable insights that are scientifically robust and valid then we need to work through the various
critiques that are being levelled at them and to make appropriate adjustments to methods and approaches.  This
makes absolute sense from a scientific perspective – science progresses by improving its ideas, methods and
theories in response to critique and internal reflection.  It shouldn’t hide from or deny critique, but rather should
embrace and confront it.  At the same time, we shouldn’t let the hype of big data and the value of new computational
techniques detract from the value of other approaches.  Big data should complement small data, not replace them.
You’ve distinguished between a new empiricism, in which ‘big data’ is understood to speak for themselves,
and a data-driven science which has a more nuanced understanding of data and how it is constituted.
Could you say a little more about this distinction and why it matters?  
In the initial hype about the explosion in big data and its potential in business,
government and science there were proclamations about how big data could
revoluntionize how we make sense of the world.  Big data was seen to offer the possibility of exhaustive, timely,
resolute data across all domains of human endeavour and, along with new sophisticated machine learning
techniques, created a situation wherein data could seemingly speak for themselves.  In the words of Chris Anderson,
the Editor of Wired, “We can analyze the data without hypotheses about what it might show. We can throw the
numbers into the biggest computing clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms find patterns
where science cannot. […] Correlation supersedes causation, and science can advance even without coherent
models, unified theories, or really any mechanistic explanation at all.”
In other words, our understanding of the world could emerge from the data, not from theory; from induction not
deduction.  This is a problematic position for a number of reasons.  Big data, despite its attempts to be exhaustive is
always partial, with gaps, biases and uncertainties.  Moreover, the data do not come from nowhere, but are
produced by systems that are designed and tested within scientific frameworks, and are surrounded by an
assemblage of different contexts and interests.  The production of big data is thus driven by knowledge and other
factors which mean the data never simply speak for themselves.
In reaction, a number of scientists have forwarded the notion of data-driven science.  This approach uses a guided
approach to mining the data, using established knowledge and abduction to direct the exploratory analytics
employed.  The resulting data are then used formulate hypotheses that are then tested using a traditional deductive
approach.  Here, there is a modification to scientific method, with a new stage inserted between inception and
testing.  By using a guided approach, a controlled and contextual approach can be undertaken that can assess
whether patterns in the data are meaningful or random/trivial, and the emerging hypotheses can be evaluated
against existing knowledge/theories.
The reason why this distinction matters is because each proposed approach has a different means of seeking to
extract value and insight from big data. Whilst data-driven science has its strengths and weaknesses it seems to
have far more benefits that the empiricist approach. In fact, the empiricist approach seems like an intellectual cul-de-
sac that will lead to erroneous conclusions and I doubt few serious scientists would subscribe to its tenets.
Do we need a philosophy of data science? Is this something that data scientists would actually be
influenced by? Does it matter? 
There are inherent philosophies of data science, whether data scientists recognize this or not. Even if a scientist
claims to have no philosophical position, she is expressing a conceptual position about how she makes sense of the
world.  On questioning, their position with respect to epistemology, ontology, ideology and methodology can be
teased out (though it might be slightly confused and not well thought through).  Philosophy is important because it
provides the intellectual framework that shapes and justifies what kinds of questions are asked, how they are asked,
how the answers are made sense of, and what one does with the resulting knowledge. Avoiding it weakens the
intellectual rigour of a project and widens the scope of potential critique. Quite often scientists avoid the difficult work
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of thinking through their philosophical position by simply accepting the tenets of a dominant paradigm, or by
operating merely at the level of methodology. Generally, this consists of a claim to using the ‘scientific method’ which
tries to position itself as a commonsensical, logical, and objective way to approach understanding the world that is
largely beyond question.
As I’ve already discussed, the philosophy of science is not fixed and does change over time with new ideas about
how to approach framing and answering questions.  This is clearly happening with debates concerning how big data
and new forms of data analytics is and can alter the scientific method, and also debates over the approach of the
digital humanities and computational social sciences.  And even if data scientists do not want to engage in such
debates, their work remains nonetheless open to philosophical critique.  In my view, the intellectual rigour of data
science would be significantly improved by working through its philosophical underpinnings and engaging in debate
that would strengthen its position through evolution in thought and practice and which rebuffs and challenges
critique.  Anything less demonstrates a profound ignorance of the intellectual foundations upon which science is
rooted.  So, yes, philosophy does and should matter to data science.
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